Earlier this month, Sweden joined 31 other countries, including the US, as the newest member of the security alliance. That’s 49 out of the 50 states in the union, then. Due to a peculiarity in geography and history, Hawaii is not officially included in the NATO alliance.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s members would not be required to defend Hawaii if a foreign force attacked it, such as the US Navy’s Pearl Harbor facility or the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters northwest of Honolulu. According to David Santoro, president of the Pacific Forum think group in Honolulu, “It’s the weirdest thing.” He also notes that most people in Hawaii are unaware that their state is officially independent of the alliance.
He claims that because people often believe Hawaii to be a part of the US, NATO protects it. However, he acknowledges that the alliance’s name—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—is a dead giveaway. Hawaii is in the Pacific, of course, and it is not a part of the continental US that borders the North Atlantic Ocean on its eastern shores like California, Colorado, or Alaska. Hawaii is the 50th state.
“Hawaii is not a part of North America, so that’s the argument for not including it,” claims Santoro. The 1949 Washington Treaty, which founded NATO ten years before Hawaii became a state, details the exception.
Article 6 of the treaty restricts the geographical reach of collective self-defense, even if Article 5 of the treaty allows for it in the event of a military attack on any member state. Article 6 states that an armed attack on any Party’s territory in Europe or North America is considered to be an armed attack on one or more of the Parties. Additionally, it states that any island territories must be located north of the Tropic of Cancer in the North Atlantic.
Hawaii is not covered by Article 5, according to a US State Department spokesman, but any circumstance that would have an impact on the 50th state should be covered by Article 4, which states that members will consult when “the territorial integrity, political independence or security” of any member is threatened.
The spokesperson added that since other members have territory outside of the bounds specified in Article 5, it is unlikely that any treaty revision to include Hawaii would be approved by consensus.
For example, when Argentine troops invaded the Falkland Islands, a disputed British territory in the South Atlantic, NATO refrained from joining the conflict with Argentina in 1982, even though the United Kingdom was a founding member of NATO.
North Korea, Taiwan, Guam, And Hawaii
In the decades since the signing of the Washington Treaty, some analysts claim that circumstances have changed, and they contend that the current political climate in the Indo-Pacific may call for reconsideration. This is due to the possibility that US military installations in Hawaii will be essential in thwarting North Korean aggression and aiding in any future Taiwanese defense.
Despite never having held control of the democratic island, China’s ruling Communist Party claims territory over it. “Reunification” with Taiwan is a crucial component of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s larger plan to “rejuvenate” the country by 2049.
Despite expressing a desire to seize the island peacefully, Chinese leaders have increased military intimidation of the region in recent years and have not ruled out using force to achieve so.
According to White House officials, US policy remains unchanged, but US President Joe Biden has indicated he would use US military personnel to defend the island in the event of a Chinese invasion. The Taiwan Relations Act requires Washington to provide weapons for the island’s defense.
The Center for a New American Security conducted a wargame in 2022 in which China attacked US command and control facilities in Hawaii as part of its effort to annex Taiwan. Hawaii’s withdrawal from NATO, according to John Hemmings, senior director of the Indo-Pacific Foreign and Security Policy Program at the Pacific Forum, eliminates “an element of deterrence” over the likelihood of a Chinese strike on Hawaii in support of any future Taiwan campaign.
He claims that by leaving Hawaii out, NATO’s European members are letting Beijing know that they may have a little “escape clause” when it comes to defending US territory in such a hypothetical circumstance. “Why wouldn’t we use that deterrent element available to us?” says Hemmings. Why would we exclude that from the discussion if it would truly prevent (China) from invading Taiwan?
The strategic significance of Hawaii has profound historical resonance for the United States. This is the location of Pearl Harbor. This is the location of the attack that sparked our entry into the Second World War, and incidentally, it was also the reason we assisted in the liberation of France,” he states. “There is a clear connection for Americans between this state, our participation in World War II, and ultimately our assistance in aiding in the defeat of the Axis (the coalition of Nazi Germany, Japan, and Italy).”
Additionally, Hemmings argues in favor of Guam, a US Pacific island state located about 3,000 miles west of Hawaii, being a part of NATO. Andersen Air Force Base is located on the island, which has long been a hub for North Korean saber-mongering. From here, the US can fire its B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers into the Indo-Pacific.
Hemmings compares Guam’s absence from NATO to the US leaving the Korean Peninsula outside of a line it drew across the Pacific in January 1950 in an effort to stop China and the Soviet Union from spreading communism. The Korean War started five months following the drawing of the so-called Acheson Line.
According to Hemmings, “The enemy feels emboldened to carry out military conflict and you end up having a war anyway.” Santoro of the Pacific Forum also says that Guam ought to be a part of NATO. He asserts, “Guam matters a lot more strategically than Hawaii.”
Partnership Of Those Willing
Some scholars contend that the strong and lasting links between the US and its democratic allies would have a far greater influence on national decision-making than a NATO treaty technicality in the event of a hypothetical attack on Hawaii or Guam.
According to Luis Simon, director of the Research Center for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance in Belgium, “I would expect… the United States to try to put together a coalition of the willing involving primarily – but certainly not exclusively – regional allies” in the event of an attack.
Simon points out that in its 74-year history, NATO has only once activated the collective self-defense mechanism under Article 5—that is, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. This response was swift and forceful. He adds, “But Washington really decided to use a coalition of the willing to direct its response rather than NATO Command.” “I think the US would want to maintain complete military control over (the response) and diplomatic flexibility in the event of an attack on either Guam or Hawaii.”
Simon adds that he sees no genuine difference between NATO countries’ allegiance to the US and the alliance. The transatlantic democratic community is based on NATO. NATO nations, including the US, have praised the alliance’s extraordinary solidarity in the face of Russia’s unannounced invasion of Ukraine. In recent years, NATO has also become more adamant in its common rhetoric on China, promising to deal with what they refer to as Beijing’s “systemic challenges.”
In the event of an attack on US sovereign land, “I personally have little doubt they would be ready to provide different forms of assistance, including individually and through multilateral venues like the (European Union) or NATO,” the man said.
